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Abstract. Based upon the context of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) actual 
research and within the innovative scope of the SESAME EU-funded research 
project, we propose and assess a framework for security analysis applied in 
virtualised Small Cell Networks, with the aim of further extending MEC in the 
broader 5G environment. More specifically, by applying the fundamental 
concepts of the SESAME original architecture that aims at providing enhanced 
multi-tenant MEC services though Small Cells coordination and virtualization, 
we focus on a realistic 5G-oriented scenario enabling the provision of large 
multi-tenant enterprise services by using MEC. Then we evaluate several 
security issues by using a formal methodology, known as Secure Tropos.  
Keywords: 5G, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), Network Functions 
Virtualization (NFV), security, Software Defined Networking (SDN), Small 
Cell (SC), virtual network function (VNF). 
1   Introduction 
In the recent years we are witnessing a widespread use of end user devices with 
advanced capabilities, such as smart-phones and tablet computers, and the emergence 
of new services and communication technologies. Modern devices implicate for 
powerful multimedia capabilities and they are increasingly penetrating the global e-
communications market, thus creating new demands on broadband (wireless or 
mobile) access. The challenge becomes greater as devices are also expected to 
actively communicate with a multiplicity of equipment (such as sensors, smart meters, 
actuators, etc.) within a fully converged framework of heterogeneous (underlying) 
network infrastructure(s). This results to the emergence of new data services and/or 
related applications that can drastically “reshape” the network usage and all 
associated demands; these are also “key success factors” in order to realize an 
effective mobile broadband experience for the benefit of our modern societies and 
economies. This new evolved ecosystem, however, imposes very strict requirements 
on the network architecture and its functionality. Enabling small end-to-end (E2E) 
latency and supporting a large number of connections at the fitting level, is not 
possible to be accomplished in current Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks. In fact, 
the fundamental limitations of current approaches lie in their centralized mobility 
management and data forwarding, as well as in insufficient support for multiple co-
existing Radio Access Technologies (RATs) [1] and for suitable adaptability to new 
architectural schemes. 
Today, a large variety of RATs and heterogeneous wireless networks have been 
successfully deployed and used. However, under the current architectural framework, 
it is not easy to integrate -or to “enable”- a way of a suitable coordination of these 
technologies. Despite the fact that the coverage of such wireless and cellular networks 
has increased by deploying more Base Stations (BSs) and Access Points (APs), the 
Quality-of-Experience (QoE) of End-Users (EUs) does not increase, accordingly. For 
example, the current architectural approach does not enable a Mobile User (MU) 
selecting the “best available network” in a dynamic and efficient way. It also does not 
enable simultaneous and coordinated use of radio resources, from different RATs. 
This leads to highly inefficient use of hardware resources (wireless infrastructure) and 
spectrum, which is worsened even more with almost uncontrollable inter-RAT 
interference [2]. In this paper, we build on a novel architectural proposed for next-
generation cellular networks. This architecture benefits from the recent advances in 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) [3] and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) 
[4], which are natively integrated into the new and novel architecture. Traditionally, 
SDN and NFV although not dependent on each other, are seen as “closely related” 
and as “complementary” concepts [5]. This integration enables good scalability in 
terms of supporting a large number of connections as well as heavy mobility 
scenarios. Also, the introduction of new services and applications becomes much 
easier. Decoupling control and data planes, and abstracting network functions from 
the underlying physical infrastructure, brings much greater flexibility to efficiently 
utilize radio and computing resources both in the Radio Access Network (RAN) [6] as 
well as in the Mobile Core Network (MCN). Furthermore, the new approach enables 
the incorporation of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) services in an easy and 
straightforward way.  
MEC, also known as “Fog computing”, is a novel concept that extends the 
services, typically provided by the Cloud, to the network edge [7], [8]. In case of 5G 
wireless networks, by the term “edge” we usually mean the RAN and some part of the 
Cloud services is provided by cognitive BSs. The provided services may include 
storage, computing, data, and application services. The available MEC infrastructure 
allows applications to run closer to the end user. This is expected to reduce the E2E 
network latency and to reduce the backhaul capacity requirements. Moreover, it 
enables better QoE of fast moving EUs, facilitates highly-interactive real-time 
applications, and even the emergence of novel applications, such as the Tactile 
Internet [9]. In this work, we focus on Small Cell (SC) BSs, which include both 
physical BSs as well as BSs that are virtualized via NFV and SDN technologies. Our 
architectural assumptions are based upon the SESAME architecture, which derives 
from an ongoing European 5G-PPP funded research project that aims at providing 
enhanced multi-tenant MEC services though Small Cells coordination and 
virtualization [10].  However, our analysis can be easily extended to alternative 
network architectures and even in the cases of Macro-Cells or combinations of 
Macro- and Small-Cells. Thus, in the present work we perform an analysis the MEC 
when applied in a selective and realistic 5G scenario enabling large multi-tenant 
enterprise services, from the security and privacy viewpoint.   
2   Previous Relevant Works 
In this section we review the most important and recent works on security and privacy 
for MEC. The fact that MEC is still at its infancy explains the very limited number of 
relevant works. These works mainly just touch the security and privacy implications 
of MEC and no adequate solutions have been proposed to address all the challenges, 
especially when considering the interaction of MEC with other technologies, such as 
SDN, and NFV, within the 5G networks context.  
In [11], a number of security and privacy challenges of MEC have been discussed. 
The considered security threats are mainly in the context of a cloud-enabled IoT 
(Internet of Things) environment. The study makes a classification of the available 
security technologies according to the involved network elements, such as 
technologies to secure a fog node (i.e., the MEC server) and an IoT node, as well as 
techniques to protect the communication. Next, two threats on the existing security 
mechanisms have been described, namely the man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack and 
malicious fog node problem. Finally, a number of high-level suggestions have been 
proposed to address the security concerns, such as intrusion detection; malicious node 
detection; data protection; and secure data management. In [12], the security issues of 
MEC have been discussed in the context of smart grids, smart traffic lights, wireless 
sensor networks, and SDN. The focus of this study is the MitM attack and, in 
particular, the stealthy features of this attack that could be addressed by examining 
the Customer Premises Unit (CPU) and memory consumption of the fog node. This 
work also addresses the assessment of authentication and authorization techniques for 
connecting the fog with the cloud. The applicability of existing techniques, such as 
signature-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection has been studied.  
In [13], the challenges of MEC with respect to digital forensics have been 
discussed. This work mainly considers sensors and various types of smart objects that 
require connectivity to the cloud and to each other. The focus of this work is to study 
processes and events that would allow to reconstruct past activity for providing digital 
evidence. Various existing solutions, such as Virtual Machine (VM) introspection and 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), have been discussed and analysed. This paper also 
makes a distinction between the techniques that can be applied in both fog and cloud, 
and between those that are only applicable in one of them. In [14], the existing data 
protection techniques have been studied with respect to their suitability in MEC. The 
conferred data theft attacks include both external intrusion as well as insider attacks. 
The paper has proposed a novel approach for data protection, using offensive decoy 
technology. According to this approach, the data access is initially monitored to detect 
any abnormal access patterns. Next, when unauthorized access in suspected, large 
amounts of decoy information is returned to the attacker. Experiments in realistic 
scenarios indicate that such kind of approach could provide sufficient levels of data 
protection in MEC environments. In [15], a number of research and security 
challenges towards realisation of MEC have been identified and analysed. One 
important conclusion drawn is that the MEC paradigm would need to develop security 
and privacy solutions to explicitly consider coexistence of trusted nodes with 
malicious ones in distributed edge settings. This will require the enforcement of 
secure and redundant routing, and trust topologies. Another implication of shifting the 
computation from the cloud to the edge is that the concentration of information is 
prevented in comparison to the centralised cloud computing approach. Hence, novel 
techniques are required to deal with fragmented information that is distributed over a 
potentially large and heterogeneous set of edge nodes.  
We observe that the existing works on security analysis of MEC mainly consider 
M2M-like scenarios, while at the same time lacking a formal methodological analysis 
approach and a study of security and privacy in MEC in relation to other coexisting 
technologies. In this work, we are trying to “fill” this gap.  
3   SESAME-based Essential Architecture 
In this section, we describe the cellular network architecture developed in the context 
of the SESAME project [4]. In the following, this architecture is referred to as the 
“SESAME architecture”. One of its key elements is the incorporation of MEC 
concepts at the RAN level, i.e. by enhancing the BSs with MEC servers. Other 
important characteristic of the architecture is the support of multi-tenancy feature 
through cellular infrastructure virtualization and NFV. Below we describe the 
involved actors and their inter-relations (as schematic representation is also given in 
Fig. 1); afterwards, we describe the functional architecture and its essential elements. 
We distinguish the following essential definitions: (i) End User (EU): It can be a 
mobile device (such as a smart-phone or a laptop) that consumes communication 
services via the cellular network; (ii) Infrastructure Owner (IO): This is the owner of 
the cellular infrastructure, such as SCs and macro BS. An IO could be, for example, a 
Venue Owner (VO) (such as mall, stadium, enterprise or municipality) or the 
traditional network operator; (iii) IT Equipment Vendor (ITEV): It is a legal 
entity/company that develops, manufactures, and/or sells IT equipment, such as BSs 
and servers; (iv) Small Cell Network Operator (SCNO): It is a legal entity/company 
that possesses the equipment so as to provide radio communications services and 
provides radio access to end users locally, by using SCs; (v) Virtual Small Cell 
Network Operator (VSCNO): It is a legal entity/company that does not possess the 
equipment but lease it from another one, so as to provide radio communications 
services and deliver services to EUs; (vi) Macro- Cell Network Operator (MCNO): It 
is a legal entity/company y that possesses the equipment so as to provide radio 
communications services and provides radio access to EUs in wide areas at the macro 
cell level; (vii) Backhaul Provider (BP): A legal entity/company that provides the 
backhaul connection (either wired or wireless) of the Small Cells and Macro Cells. 
This could be an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or the traditional Mobile Network 
Operator; (viii) Service Provider (SP): This is a legal entity/company that produces, 
controls and distributes services over the MNO/VMNO. (This could include, for 
example, the traditional Over-the-Top (OTT) players); (ix) Virtual Function 
Provider (VFP): This is a legal entity/company that supplies virtual network 
functions and other appliances, such as gateways, proxies, firewalls and transcoders. 
In this way, the need for the customer to acquire, install, and maintain specialised 
hardware is essentially eliminated, and; (x) Spectrum Owner (SO): This is a legal 
entity/company that owes a particular piece of spectrum in a given geographical area. 
Nowadays, the SO is essentially the MNO who leases the spectrum from the relevant 
national authority. However, it is envisioned that in the future an independent player 
may owe the spectrum and lease it to an operator (such as MCNO, SCNO, VSCNO).   
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Actors and their relationships 
As shown in Fig.1, the EU is dependent on the SP for receiving one or more 
services (such as the video streaming service). To provide that, the SP depends on the 
SCNO or the VSCNO who provide the SC connectivity, and also on the VFP who 
provides the required (virtual) network functions. Both, SCNO and VSCNO are 
dependent on the VO who owes the SC infrastructure. Finally, the VSCNO is also 
dependent on the BP (e.g., an ISP) who provides backhaul connectivity as well as on 
the MCNO who provides the macro-cell connectivity.    
 
 
 
Fig. 2. SESAME functional architecture 
We describe, in brief, the SESAME functional architecture, which is also 
illustrated in Fig. 2. Firstly, we provide the basic component definitions and 
afterwards we describe “how these components interact with each other”. In fact, we 
identify the following fundamental components: (i) MEC server: It is specialised 
hardware that is placed inside the SC and provides processing power, memory and 
storage capabilities, and networking resources; (ii) Cloud Enabled Small Cell 
(CESC): This is the SC device which has been enriched with a MEC server; (iii) 
CESC cluster: A group of CESCs that are collocated, able to exchange information 
and properly coordinated; as a trivial case, a CESC cluster could comprise one CESC; 
(iv) Light Data Center (Light DC): It is a cluster of MEC servers. In particular, the 
Light DC is a logical entity consisting of a set of distributed MEC servers of the same 
CESC cluster; (v) Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM): This is an entity 
responsible for management of the virtual hardware (i.e., Virtual Machines-VMs) and 
networking resources of a single Light DC; in particular, the VIM manages the 
lifecycle, provision, placement, and operation of VMs. The VIM is also responsible 
for the allocation of Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) over the hardware it manages 
and offers functionalities to control virtual networks across VNF instances and 
associate storage to them. The VIM offers an aggregated view of compute, network 
and storage resources of the Light DC; (vi) CESC Manager (CESCM): The 
architectural component in charge of managing and orchestrating the cloud 
environment of the Light DC; it can simultaneously manage multiple clusters, a 
cluster or a single CESC. The CESC Manager also manages the radio access and 
“self-x” functionalities, e.g., self-optimising, self-healing and self-configuring of the 
Small Cells contained in each CESC cluster, in order to guarantee the service 
continuity and the required performance of services. The CESCM orchestrates 
services and, consequently, manages the VIM to compose them with virtual resources. 
A CESCM is actually a functionality that will be “mapped” on to the distributed 
physical elements. As mentioned before, one important feature of this architecture is 
the distributed set of MEC servers which can logically “be grouped into clusters”, 
thus effectively forming a Light DC at the network edge. Clusters are able to 
communicate with each other as well as with the mobile core network (i.e., Evolved 
Packet Core (EPC) in LTE terminology). The distributed deployment of MEC servers 
facilitates flexible and dynamic allocation of resources in cases of flash crowd events 
and fast EU mobility. 
4   Security and Privacy Considerations 
Network and system security is a very critical issue because the SESAME system is 
expected to support both customer enterprises and end users, who cannot tolerate 
financial losses or data privacy violations and, therefore, they seek the highest 
possible security guarantees. In the present section, the considered SESAME scenario 
and functional components are evaluated by using a formal methodology known as 
the Secure Tropos (SecTro) [16]. Our goal is to identify, model and analyse security 
issues from the early stages of system design and software development as well as to 
model and analyse threats and vulnerabilities in existing software and protocols that 
will be used in the SESAME system. We aim at preventing a wide range of attacks, 
such as control hijacking, reverse engineering, malware injection, eavesdropping, just 
to name a few. At the same time, the innovative SESAME concepts and technologies 
can provide invaluable opportunities of developing modern solutions for attack 
prevention, management and recovery. 
First of all, the physical security of CESC infrastructure and hardware integrity has 
to be ensured. Hence, appropriate security controls (such as those in [17]) should be 
deployed by the CESC infrastructure owner, to prevent hardware tampering. 
Likewise, it is important to consider attacks that are initiated from the cloud side. This 
is particularly relevant in scenarios where multiple enterprises using private clouds 
are hosted. Especially in the multi-tenant environment of SESAME, the adversary per 
se could be a legitimate tenant interacting with network entities by using valid 
credentials and having privileged access to virtualised resources. Also, the emerging 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) trend [18] in many enterprises constitutes many 
conventional security solutions incapable of protecting the private network; for 
example, a Trojan horse, that infected an employee’s device, can bypass the security 
of the corporate firewall. Hence, the cloud provider must ensure the physical security 
of the cloud infrastructure and of the data centres. This can be done, e.g., by following 
the recommendations from the Cloud Security Alliance [19]. Moreover, the selection 
of suitable cloud provider can be based on formal methodologies to ensure that the 
security and privacy requirements are properly met [20]. This effectively means that 
services offered by cloud providers who do not meet the specified requirements and 
have not implemented the mandatory security controls, could so be restricted or even 
could be blocked. To ensure confidentiality and integrity of the User Equipment (UE) 
data, cryptographic security controls must be in place. This is to say that any adopted 
Public-Key scheme that enables the encryption of the communications among CESC, 
UE and the cloud, must be sufficiently secure. Cryptographic and privacy protection 
techniques are particularly important in cases where an EU receives service from 
multiple service or network providers, due to mobility or QoE considerations. 
An important category of attacks could potentially “target” the management system 
(for example, if initiated inside virtualised environments and aims at taking control of 
the Hypervisor shown in Fig. 2). Also, the NFV Orchestrator is an attractive “attack 
target” due to being in the “middle” of the system model architecture; the same can be 
for other components of the management layer, such as the VNF Manager. Also, 
impersonation by the adversary of one of the VNFs or the MEC server when 
communicating with the management layer could be a potential threat. Considering 
again the virtualised environment, both host and guest Operating Systems (OSs) may 
be targeted, and to alleviate the impact of such an attack, adequate isolation must be 
enforced between guest VMs, as well as between the host and guest VMs. The 
adversary could attempt to break the isolation by exploiting, e.g., some flaws of the 
used virtualisation platform [12]. Therefore, appropriate choice of the virtualisation 
platform that meets security and privacy requirements is of major importance.  
In some cases, to launch an attack against a component, the adversary requires that 
this component has specific exploitable configuration or runs specific software. For 
example, a precondition for a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack can be specific 
configuration of the CESCM with regard to the allocation of resources to tenants. Yet, 
some flaws in the resource allocation algorithm can allow the adversary to prevent a 
tenant from accessing its portion of virtual resources. The introduction of the MEC 
paradigm has also implications on the E2E security in 5G networks. A potential 
solution for this problem is to facilitate the network slicing concept, according which 
each application or network flow get its own slide of the network. This allows the 
end-to-end security to be enforced within each slice by each application individually 
and any security breaches would not affect other applications. As security will be a 
fundamental enabling factor of future 5G networks, we are concerned with identifying 
and mitigating security threats and vulnerabilities against a broad range of targets at 
the intersection of MEC with “Small Cells-as a-Service” (SCaaS), SDN, and NFV. 
These will have crucial effect on legal and regulatory frameworks as well as on 
decisions of businesses, governments, and end users.  
4.1   Scenario: Enabling Large Multi-Tenant Enterprise Services by using MEC 
To further emphasize, we consider a Small Cell Network Operator (SCNO) who is 
providing a radio interface to a number of distinct mobile operators (MOs), virtual 
mobile network operators (VMNOs) and virtual small cell network operators 
(VSCNOs). The SCNO may transmit by using licensed or unlicensed spectrum over 
the air interface. In addition to the provision of radio coverage in the business centre 
and orchestration of multi-tenancy, the SCNO offers a platform for MEC for low 
latency and compute intensive applications/services. The MOs, VMNOs and 
VSCNOs provide both in-house and third party services from over-the-top (OTT) 
players or the service providers (SPs). The offered services can include inter-alia: 
multi-person real-time video-conferencing, virtual presence 360° video 
communications with meetings using virtual presence glasses/devices, and assisted 
reality to actively inform users of ambient interests such as danger warnings to 
support people with disabilities and improve interactions with their surroundings. 
The End Users (EUs) can benefit from fast and cost-effective access to a wide 
variety of innovative services from third party players. MOs, VMNOs and VSCNOs 
can benefit from extra market share. Venue owners (VOs) can benefit from having a 
single set of radio and IT equipment installed on the premises, instead of multiple 
installations from multiple network operators. The CESC is made up of: hardware 
resources, virtualisation layer, virtual network functions (VNFs), and an Element 
Management System (EMS). The virtualisation layer abstracts the hardware resources 
and decouples the VNF software from the underlying hardware. A VNF is a 
virtualisation of a network function in a legacy non-virtualised network. The EMS 
performs management of one or more VNFs. A cluster of CESCs is managed by the 
CESCM that constitutes of: virtualised infrastructure manager (VIM), VNF manager 
and the network functions virtualisation orchestrator (NFVO). The VIM manages the 
interaction of a VNF with the compute, storage and network resources under its 
specific authority. The VNF manager is responsible for VNF lifecycle management. 
The orchestrator is in charge of orchestration, of management NFV infrastructure and 
software resources and of realising network services.   
In Fig. 3 we demonstrate how this scenario can be supported by the specific 
SESAME system. In particular, we see a CESC infrastructure provider who owns, 
deploys and maintains the network of CESCs inside the premises where different 
enterprises are hosted. The CESC provider has a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with 
each customer enterprise and SLAs are to enable enterprise users to a number of 
services offered by the CESC network; the SLA shall cover the target performance 
metrics for any service (or service category) required by each enterprise, supporting 
different tenants’ requirements. Such sort of services can be categorised in data 
services and real-time services: these can include, inter-alia, Internet access for 
enterprise users, web browsing, file sharing, electronic mail service, voice 
communications and video conferencing. The deployment of MEC servers with high 
processing capabilities can enable close-to-zero latency and enhanced QoE of the 
enterprise users (i.e., an enhanced handling of the media flows and, consequently, an 
optimal QoE). In addition to the computing resources, MEC servers can provide 
storage resources and support content caching at the network edge. The reality is that 
different hosted enterprises may have different traffic patterns which may fluctuate 
greatly, depending on the time of the day or on special occasions, such as popular 
events. This leads to the requirement of a “flexible” system which can be scaled up 
and down, on demand. For example, most enterprises may need a higher capacity and 
higher quality of service (QoS) during the office hours, while a security firm 
providing security to the building would need a low capacity and the same service 
quality throughout the day. The main issues may arise from possible service 
disruptions and from the dynamicity of the enterprise activity. The service quality 
levels can be dynamic (time variant) as well. In some instants, the total capacity and 
the number of connected devices for a certain enterprise could rise significantly. This 
can be an event like an Annual General Meeting or a conference/exhibition organised 
by the enterprise. This extra capacity / connections may not need the same QoS and 
may not access the internal enterprise data, so may not need the same level of 
security. The main requirements are for the available capacity to be rapidly scaled up 
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and other virtual network(s) created mainly for open access. Also in some cases, 
certain enterprises may downsize their operations or move out of the premise, which 
requires scaling down. This kind of scalability and flexibility needs to be incorporated 
into the design of particular use cases for this representative scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scenario: Enterprise services in multi-tenant large businesses 
 
The enterprise scenario shown in Fig. 3 will leverage on SESAME features such as 
intrinsic support of multi-tenancy by enabling multiple SC operators since Small Cells 
operators to provide network services and connectivity over the network owned by a 
single CESC infrastructure provider. Furthermore, the SESAME system allows native 
incorporation of self-organizing network techniques, which can be adapted to network 
behaviour and can optimize service delivery to the enterprise users. In any case, the 
high level of network security as demanded by the enterprise customers will be an 
inherent feature of the respective SESAME solutions. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Involved actors in the selected scenario 
In Fig. 4, we present the actors involved in the scenario, their corresponding goals 
as well as their dependencies. We identify four major actors, namely CESC 
infrastructure provider, Virtual SCNO, ISP and enterprise. The enterprise depends on 
the SC operator which provides the wireless connectivity. The SC operator requires 
backhaul connectivity and access to external networks, such as Internet. This can be 
provided by an ISP. Finally, the SC operator in order to provide its services to 
multiple enterprises depends on the CESC infrastructure which is owned and 
maintained by the CESC provider. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Security components view for the CESC provider 
In Figs. 5 and 6 we present the Security Components View for two main actors of 
this scenario: the CESC provider and the virtual SCNO. The security component view 
of the CESC provider, depicted in Fig. 5, contains two “resources” that need to be 
protected: the Hypervisor and the Tenant’s Data. A resource in the Secure Tropos 
terminology could be a physical or an informational entity, and in the SecTro tool is 
depicted as a yellow, rectangular box. A resource is required to achieve a specific 
“goal” of an actor (the CESC provider in this example). A goal represents an actor’s 
strategic interests. In this example, we consider two primary goals (depicted as green 
ovals): operating the CESC infrastructure and enabling multi-tenancy. Both these 
goals require the Hypervisor as a primary resource. Also, to enable multi-tenancy, the 
Tenant’s Data resource has to be created. A goal could be restricted by a “security 
constraint” (depicted as a red octagon). In this example, the CESC infrastructure 
operation is restricted by the requirement to protect the control plane, whereas the 
multi-tenancy goal is restricted by the requirement to prevent unauthorized access to 
another tenant’s VM. Various security constraints must satisfy a number of “security 
objectives” (depicted as blue hexagons). In this example, the security constraints are 
satisfied by the two objectives: Protect the Control Plane and Prevent Access to 
another Tenant’s VM. These objectives are implemented by using a number of 
“security mechanisms” (green hexagons), such as VM isolation, Data Encryption, and 
Server Replication. We also consider a number of “threats” (depicted as 
pentagons) that impact some of the resources. In this example, the Hypervisor can be 
impacted by the two threats: Control Hijacking and Denial of Service. The Tenant’s 
Data resource can be impacted by the Eavesdropping threat.   
The security component view of the Virtual SCNO, depicted in Fig. 6, contains 
three resources that need to be protected: the Radio Resources, the Radio Spectrum 
and the Element Management System (EMS). In this example, the actor’s primary 
goals (that require the above resources) are to provide wireless capacity and spectrum 
to the tenants. The corresponding security constraints that restrict these goals are to 
protect the management plane, to prevent unauthorized access to the wireless 
spectrum and to protect user data. These constraints must be satisfied by two security 
objectives: Ensure service availability and ensure data confidentiality. The 
corresponding security mechanisms to implement these objectives are using firewalls 
and access control mechanisms. Finally, a number of threats could impact the 
considered resources, such as DoS, control hijacking and radio jamming attacks. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Security components view for the virtual SC network operator (SCNO) 
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